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Computer systems, even when correctly designed, can suffer from tem-
porary errors due to radiation particles striking the circuit or changes in the
operating conditions such as the temperature or the voltage. Such transient
errors can cause systems to malfunction or even crash. Fault injection is a
technique used for simulating the effect of such errors on the system. Fault
injection tools inject errors in either the software running on the processors
or in the underlying computer hardware to simulate the effect of a fault and
observe the system behavior. These tools can be used to determine the dif-
ferent responses of the system to such errors and estimate the probability of
occurrence of errors in the computations performed by the system. They can
also be used to test the fault tolerance capabilities of the system under test or
any proposed technique for providing fault tolerance in circuits or software.
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As a part of this thesis, I have developed a software implemented fault
injection tool, Fiesta++, for evaluating the fault tolerance and fault response
of software applications. Software implemented fault injection tools inject
errors to simulate the effects of a fault into the software state of the application
as it runs on a processor. Since such fault injection tools are used to conduct
experiments on applications executing natively on a processor, the experiments
can be carried out at almost the same speed as the application execution and
can be run on the same hardware as used by the software application in the
field.
Fiesta++ offers two modes of operation: whitebox and blackbox. The
whitebox mode assumes that users have some degree of knowledge of the struc-
ture of the software under test and allows them to specify fault injection targets
in terms of the application variables and fault injection time in terms of code
locations and events at run time. It can be used for precise fault injection to
get reproducible outcomes from the fault injection experiments. The blackbox
mode is targeted for the case where the user has very little or no knowledge of
the application code structure. In this mode, Fiesta++ provides the user with
a view of the active process memory and an array of associated information
which a user can use to inject faults.
v
Table of Contents
Abstract iv
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Fault Injection Techniques 4
2.1 Hardware based fault injection tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1 Simulation based hardware fault injection . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Emulation based hardware fault injection . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Software implemented fault injection (SWIFI) . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Compiler based Fault Injection and Profiling . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Importance of Software based Fault Injection . . . . . . . . . . 12
Chapter 3. Fiesta++ 14
3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 Fault injection framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.1 Modes of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.2 Fault Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3 Black Box Mode Fault Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3.1 Fault Injection Timing and Location . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3.2 Obtaining Runtime Allocated Dynamic Memory . . . . 19
3.3.3 Runtime Stack Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3.4 Extracting Global Variable Addresses . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4 White Box Mode Fault Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4.1 Fault Injection Target and Location . . . . . . . . . . . 23
vi
Chapter 4. Fault Injection Experiments using Fiesta++ 26
4.1 Fault vulnerability over application runtime . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.1 Dynamic memory fault vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.2 Stack memory fault vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1.3 Global variable fault vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2 Fault vulnerability of different stack regions . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2.1 Fault vulnerability in the top most stack frame . . . . . 33
4.2.2 Fault injection in function call signature . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.3 Fault injection in local variables and function arguments 35
4.3 Fault Injection Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Chapter 5. Future Work 39
Bibliography 41
vii
List of Tables
2.1 Comparison of different fault injection techniques . . . . . . . 5
4.1 Fault injection outcome distribution for fault injected in the
application dynamic memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2 Fault injection outcome distribution for errors in the top stack
frame. The numbers in parentheses are the error outcome prob-
abilities when fault is injected at a random address chosen from
the full application stack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3 Fault injection outcome distribution for errors in function sig-
nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4 Fault injection outcome distribution for errors in the local vari-
ables and function arguments. The numbers in parentheses are
the error outcome probabilities when fault is injected at a ran-
dom address chosen from the full application stack. . . . . . . 36
4.5 Run time overhead in seconds posed by the Fiesta++ fault in-
jection mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
viii
List of Figures
2.1 Hardware based fault injection by instrumenting flip-flops . . . 8
2.2 General framework used by software implemented fault injec-
tion tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Fiesta++ framework.The blocks shaded green are a part of the
Fiesta++ framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 The runtime stack frame structure for applications. . . . . . . 21
3.3 An example of using scope and variable access specification to
describe fault timing in whitebox mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4 Flowchart for deciding the fault injection time in whitebox mode 24
4.1 Dynamic memory fault vulnerability for SPEC2000 benchmark
applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2 Local variable fault vulnerability for SPEC2000 benchmark ap-
plications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 Global variable fault vulnerability for SPEC2000 benchmark
applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
Transient faults, in reference to computer systems, are abnormalities
in circuit operation that occur for a short time period, generally for a single
or a few clock cycles. Transient faults can be caused by radiation particles
hitting circuit elements or variations in the voltage, current, or the temperature
of the circuit. Even a properly verified and correctly functional circuit can
encounter an error during operation due to a transient fault. With the scaling
in the transistor sizes over years, the noise margins for memory elements have
decreased and variations in the circuit environment parameters such as voltage
and temperature have increased [20]. All these factors have made the circuits
more vulnerable to transient faults and today most circuits have to be designed
to be tolerant to such faults [12].
Dependability is a critical feature for most computer systems which
needs to be properly evaluated and quantified. For computer systems, tran-
sient faults pose a significant challenge to the system dependability and their
effect on dependability needs to be evaluated. Observing transient faults in an
actual system is not a feasible mechanism for such an evaluation as the occur-
rence of transient faults is rather unpredictable and often rare when compared
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with the usual system runtime. Fault injection tools provide a way to inject
faults in an otherwise functional system so that sufficient experimental data
can be obtained to evaluate the dependability of the system in their presence.
Fault injection tools are used to simulate the effect of both the transient faults
and the permanent faults. This thesis mainly focuses on injection of errors to
simulate transient faults in applications and limits the discussion to those.
Fault injection tools inject a fault by changing signal/variable values at
run time and then observing the effect on the output or behavior of the system.
Most fault injection systems are designed to simulate the fault behavior of
microprocessors as they are the most widely used integrated circuits and the
systems employing them are too complex to be analyzed without empirical
methods.
Fault injection tools are used to find answers to two important ques-
tions. First, what is the effect of a fault on the output and behavior of the
processor or the software executing on it? Second, what is the probability of
these observed effects, given that a fault has occurred?
The effect of a transient fault has been very well understood at the
circuit level. It has been shown [6] that most of the time a transient fault
results in the bit value stored in a circuit memory element being flipped. Most
fault injection tools use this fault model and build on it to simulate the effects
of a transient fault.
Today’s processors contain millions of memory elements susceptible to
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transient faults. Applications that run on these processors execute over tril-
lions of clock cycles and a transient fault can occur during any execution
cycle. Thus, the total number of possible transient faults in different appli-
cation contexts is enormous. It is impossible to evaluate the outcomes of all
possible faults or enumerate all faults to compute the exact probabilities of
occurrence of any particular outcome. Fault injection tools generally operate
by injecting random faults at random time points. If a sufficiently large num-
ber of such fault injection experiments are conducted, it can be assumed that
the statistics for the fault outcomes obtained are close to the actual outcome
probabilities.
This thesis describes a software implemented fault injection tool, Fi-
esta++, that can be used to evaluate the dependability of a software applica-
tion in the presence of transient faults. It provides two modes of operation:
blackbox and whitebox modes, which allow the user to evaluate the applica-
tion under test with or without knowledge of the internals of the application
software.
The rest of this thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter 2
provides a brief description of the prior work on fault injection tools, the dif-
ferent approaches taken, the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
Chapter 3 describes the framework, internals and working of Fiesta++. In
Chapter 4, I discuss the results of a few fault injection experiments conducted
and the conclusions drawn from those using Fiesta++. Chapter 5 concludes
the thesis and provides a future path for extending this work.
3
Chapter 2
Fault Injection Techniques
Processor fault injection tools can be classified based on the level of
abstraction at which that they operate. The following sections discuss the
classes of fault injection tools available and give brief summaries of the popular
techniques. Table 2.1 provides a comparison chart for the different classes of
fault injection tools using a few relevant parameters.
2.1 Hardware based fault injection tools
Hardware based fault injection methods estimate the effect of a hard-
ware level fault by simulating or emulating the circuit behavior after a fault.
These tools either modify the circuit to introduce a mechanism to modify spe-
cific signal values in the circuit or modify the hardware simulators to do the
same during circuit simulation. Since the single bit flip fault model used by the
hardware based fault injectors accurately represents the actual phenomenon
of transient faults in circuits, the statistics produced by hardware based fault
injection tools generally give an accurate picture of the behavior of system
in case of a hardware transient fault. All the hardware based fault injection
techniques can be further categorized into two sub-classes, simulation based
4
Fault
Injection
Technique
Fault
Model
Accuracy
Experiment
Speed
Experiment
Cost and
Portability
Experiment
Repro-
ducibility
Possible Use Cases
Hardware
(emulation
based)
High Medium High High
Testing hardware fault
tolerance for small
embedded processors and
applications with short
run time. The cost of
emulating hardware limits
the size of circuit under
test.
Hardware
(simulation
based)
High
Extremely
Slow
Low High
Can be used where
emulation based hardware
injection is not possible,
yet accuracy is important.
Slow simulation speeds
implies only low latency
errors can be observed.
Software
based
Low Fast Low High
Testing fault tolerance of
large and complex
applications on complex
processors where accuracy
of fault outcome
probabilities is not
important.
Radiation
based
High Fast High Low
Validating fault model for
radiation based transient
faults, evaluating
dependability for
multi-component systems
Compiler
based
High Fast High High
Predicting effects of the
fault, collapsing the
number of fault injection
experiments to be carried
out
Table 2.1: Comparison of different fault injection techniques
5
and emulation based techniques.
2.1.1 Simulation based hardware fault injection
Simulation based hardware fault injection techniques simulate the hard-
ware description of the circuit under test using HDL simulators and during
the simulation inject faults. Most of such techniques [3, 13, 22, 24] modify the
hardware description of the circuit under test to include components necessary
for injecting faults. These fault injection components can be modeled to inject
different fault behavior depending on the fault model. Faults can also be in-
jected using hardware description language (HDL) simulator commands which
allow the variables and signals of the circuit under simulation to be modified.
Such methods [13] do not require modification of the hardware description of
the circuit under test for fault injection and hence are easier to implement.
A major disadvantage of simulation based techniques is that they are
extremely slow. Simulating the register transfer level (RTL) description of a
circuit is multiple orders of magnitude slower than the actual circuit opera-
tion speed. Hence, even for relatively small processors, simulation based fault
injection tools can only evaluate the fault propagation for a few seconds of
processor operation. It can only be used to observe the low latency faults that
manifest as errors within a few seconds after injection.
However, these techniques provide an easy and accurate way to test
the behavior of different fault models in different parts of the circuit. These
techniques can be used to observe the effect of low latency errors which man-
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ifest in either memory or register errors in short time periods. Once the error
manifests itself in registers or memory contents, software implemented fault
injection tools can be used to speed up the simulation of the error effect.
2.1.2 Emulation based hardware fault injection
Since simulation based fault injection experiments tend to be very slow,
emulation based techniques were proposed. These techniques use reconfig-
urable circuits such as FPGAs to create modified versions of the test circuit
that is capable of injecting faults at run time. The modified circuit contains
flip-flops which can flip their output bit based on a control signal value. Such
techniques require an additional control mechanism to specify the time and
location of fault injection in the circuit. If such a control mechanism is imple-
mented in circuit, its complexity increases with the number of fault injectable
memory elements. And thus only a small set of flip-flops or memory elements
can be instrumented for fault injection and the circuit needs to be reconfigured
and reprogrammed on the FPGA if the fault needs to be injected in a different
part of the circuit.
Antoni et al. [2] proposed a technique which reconfigured the circuit at
run time on a FPGA. This eliminates the need for having a complex control
circuit to determine the fault injection location. However, the time required
to reconfigure the circuit could be significant when compared to the total
application run time.
Civera et al. [7] proposed another solution for providing a more flexible
7
   Fault 
Injection
 Control
    Bit
   Global
Fault Inject
   Enable
SCLK
To next FFFrom previous FF
 CLK
From Circuit
To Circuit
Figure 2.1: Hardware based fault injection by instrumenting flip-flops
control over runtime fault injection. They used modified flip-flops capable
of injecting faults based on a control bit associated with each flip-flop. All
these control bits are tied together like a scan-chain and at run time can be
programmed to inject fault in any desired flip-flop in the circuit. Figure 2.1
illustrates the fault injection mechanism used such techniques.
A few recent techniques [8, 21] use on-chip debugging resources such as
scan chains and JTAG debugging support for changing the state of the flip-
flops in the circuit at run time. This allows the actual circuit to be tested
for fault tolerance and the experiments can be carried out at speed and hence
large applications can be tested.
2.2 Software implemented fault injection (SWIFI)
Software implemented fault injection tools use a software level abstrac-
tion of the single bit flip model to inject errors in software while it runs.
These tools trade-off fault model accuracy for speed of fault injection exper-
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iments and ability to test large applications. Also, these tools do not need
any hardware changes or additional hardware to run experiments. Software
implemented fault injectors provide a way to test complete systems with real
hardware and software, including the operating system, for fault tolerance and
effects of fault. This makes software implemented fault injection techniques
quite popular and a large number software implemented fault injection tools
exist [1, 5, 9, 16–18, 23].
One of the earliest software implemented fault injectors, FIAT [23] in-
jected single bit flips in the instruction memory of the applications to model
different type of faults. FERRARI [16] uses a parallel deamon process run-
ning on the host processor to control the application process in which the
faults need to be injected. It is capable of injecting faults in the address, data
or the control lines of the processor. DOCTOR [9] is a software implemented
fault injection tool for injecting errors which can be used for injecting faults in
distributed computing systems. It is able to inject CPU faults, memory faults
and communication faults in such systems. DEFINE [17] provides a similar
framework for injecting faults and analyzing results in distributed real-time
systems. PROPANE [11] is a runtime fault injection tool that can inject soft-
ware errors by mutating the source code at run time or changing the variable
and memory contents.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the general framework on which these software
implemented fault injectors are built. They generally consist of an experiment
manager that decides which fault to inject and when. The fault injector run-
9
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Figure 2.2: General framework used by software implemented fault injection
tools
ning on the client processor inject faults into the application under test. An
application observer monitors the application under test’s behavior and reports
the outcome of the experiment to the experiment manager. The experiment
manager and the observer are generally resident on a separate machine to
ensure that a system crash caused by any fault injection doesn’t affect the
experiment.
Jin et al. [14] have developed a fault injector using the dynamic binary
instrumentation tool PIN. PIN allows insertion of code dynamically at run
time allowing a fault to be injected at specific points in the application code.
This tool targets software faults that result from common coding errors. They
profile the application binary for possible fault sites and instrument these fault
sites with modified instruction sequences.
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2.3 Compiler based Fault Injection and Profiling
LLFI [25] is a compile time fault injection tool based on the LLVM
compiler infrastructure. LLFI inserts fault injecting code into the compiler
intermediate representation code of the application software. One of the ad-
vantages of using compiler based fault injection is that some level of static
analysis can be done on the fault behavior to infer the outcome of a fault
without simulating it.
Relyzer [10] is another technique which uses compiler based techniques
to determine the equivalence of different fault sites in an application. As
mentioned earlier, the total number of possible fault locations, even for a
small processor running a moderately sized application, can be enormous.
Random fault injection, as done by the hardware and software implemented
fault injection techniques, may not be able to distinguish between equivalent
fault sites and would lead to redundant fault injection experiments.
Benso et al. [4] have done similar work in estimating criticality of data
variables in a program and provide a mathematical framework for estimating
the data criticality of application data variables. Such techniques can help
in aiding experimental fault injection improve coverage by determining the
equivalence of different faults or by predicting the outcome of a fault.
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2.4 Importance of Software based Fault Injection
Software based fault injection limits the fault injection at a higher,
software visible abstraction level such as memory contents and registers. The
actual transient faults occur at the device level and a single bit flip at the device
level may not be accurately represented by a single bit flip at the software
abstraction level [6]. The hardware based fault injection techniques, on the
other hand, can accurately replicate the effect of a transient fault. This brings
to question the relevance of software implemented fault injection techniques.
Many applications run on large complex super-scalar processors for
which designing hardware based fault injection may be impractical. Most
of the hardware based fault injection techniques have been demonstrated on
small processors with a few hundreds or thousand flip-flops in their design.
Developing hardware based fault injection would be difficult for the large and
complex processors used in most practical applications.
Also, the hardware based fault injections have been carried out only on
small snippets of code. Our experiments presented in the later chapters show
that the fault outcome probabilities vary significantly in different parts of the
software. Thus, projecting the fault outcome probabilities of a small set of
instructions to the entire application run may not be accurate.
Software based fault injection tools are indispensable for estimating the
fault outcome and probabilities for large supercomputing applications. These
applications which run on hundreds of processors for extended periods of time
12
face significant risk of fault occurrence during the application run. Hardware
based fault injection cannot be used to evaluate such large applications.
13
Chapter 3
Fiesta++
3.1 Motivation
Most software based fault injection tools provide only an interface to
inject faults at random memory locations. This limits the fault models that
can be used to specify fault location and timing.
Fiesta++ was developed with the aim of providing the user with a
meaningful interface with useful information about the software state for de-
veloping detailed and meaningful fault models. It provides a mechanism to
specify custom fault models as programmable C code. Along with hardware
faults, it can also model software faults and thus can be used for testing
for software bugs. Fiesta++ provides two modes of operation, whitebox and
blackbox mode, that allows fault injection campaigns to be carried out on
software irrespective of whether the user has knowledge about the software
code structure of the application under test. It can be used to carry out fault
injection experiments even in parallel and distributed applications running on
large computing clusters. It can be directed to inject faults in a specific thread
or multiple threads of an application, simultaneously.
14
3.2 Fault injection framework
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Figure 3.1: Fiesta++ framework.The blocks shaded green are a part of the
Fiesta++ framework.
Figure 3.1 describes the Fiesta++ framework. The framework for Fi-
esta++ is similar to most software based fault injectors. The experiment
manager, is the main controller that oversees the fault injection experiment.
The experiment parameters are supplied by the user using a configuration file.
The experiment manager supplies the fault location, timing and model
information to the fault injector whenever a fault is to be injected in the ap-
plication under test. The Fiesta++ fault injector utilizes the GNU debugger
tool (GDB) that is available on most Linux systems, to inject faults in the ap-
plication process memory. GDB apart from providing fault injection support,
also provides an interface to query some of the runtime memory information
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such as the active stack frames and information about the application binary.
The process monitor observes the runtime behavior of target application
on which the fault injection needs to be carried out. It analyzes the output of
the application to determine whether the injected fault affects the application
output and behavior, and how it does so. It communicates the output of the
experiment to the experiment manager. The target application needs to be
linked with special memory tracking libraries which Fiesta++ uses to query
the runtime memory state.
Fiesta++ uses the GNU debugger (GDB) which is used attach to any
process running on either the host or remote machines and is used to control
the process and inject faults. GDB is an open source debugging application
which uses the ptrace system call in Unix systems to attach to a running
process. GDB allows the user to set breakpoints in the target application
code, set watchpoints to monitor the value of variables, examine/modify the
process memory at any point during the application run time and control the
process execution. Fiesta++ leverages these capabilities provided by GDB to
provide a highly configurable and programmable fault injection tool.
3.2.1 Modes of operation
Fiesta++ has two basic modes of operation, blackbox mode and white-
box mode. The blackbox mode assumes that a user has no knowledge of the
underlying code. In this mode the user specifies the fault model for the faults
and the time instants at which these faults need to be injected. The tool at
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run time stops the target process at the user specified time instants, extracts
the valid data memory (on the heap,the stack and globals) and injects the
faults as specified by the fault model. This mode is useful for testing software
for which the source code is unavailable. For many applications that use third
party software, such a fault injection tool would be useful.
In the whitebox mode, it is assumed that the user has some knowledge
and access to the source code. This mode can be used by software developers to
test specific parts of their software for soft-error vulnerability. In the whitebox
mode, Fiesta++ allows the user to specify which variables to inject the faults
in and when during the application execution to inject faults. The timing of
fault injection is specified in terms of the number of times a particular region
of code has been executed and the number of times the target variable has
been accessed. Fiesta++ uses the hardware breakpoint capability provided
by the microprocessors to monitor the target data variables without slowing
down the target process significantly. These operating modes are explained in
detail in later sections of this chapter.
3.2.2 Fault Models
Fiesta++ currently provides four basic fault models that emulate both
hardware faults and software bugs.
1. Single bit flips
2. Increment variable value
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3. Decrement variable value
4. Reset to zero.
Custom fault models can also be developed for more specific fault in-
jections. For example, Fiesta++ provides functions to query the runtime
memory state. Using these functions, a fault model could be developed that
injects fault just in the local variables inside the currently executing function.
Since the fault injection is controlled by the Fiesta++ wrapper code around
GDB, it can be easily configured to add any fault model that can be specified
using a C program.
3.3 Black Box Mode Fault Injection
The blackbox mode of operation in Fiesta++ provides a mechanism
for a user to carry out fault injection campaigns on an application without
knowing its internal structure. The user can treat the software under test as
a black box. For injecting a fault in an application at runtime, the temporal
(timing of the fault injection) and spatial (the fault target) parameters for the
fault need to be specified. The following sections describe the mechanisms for
specifying these parameters.
3.3.1 Fault Injection Timing and Location
The time for fault injection in the blackbox mode is specified in seconds
of run time from the start of the program. Such a mechanism does not provide
18
an accurate, replicable fault injection, since the execution time of the applica-
tion will vary, depending on the runtime environment. However, as the user
has little knowledge of the application under test, there is very little scope for
improving on the fault injection timing accuracy. This mode allows the user
to test the fault vulnerability of an application at different points during the
run time.
The fault location can be specified as one of three memory regions:
heap, stack and global data. The exact fault location is determined by the fault
model. The default fault model choses a random address from the allocated
memory for the application. The total memory in use in the specified memory
region is extracted at the fault injection time and a random memory address
in this computed list is chosen as the target of fault injection. Although the
current version cannot specify registers as a fault target, it can be trivially
inserted.
Many fault injectors randomly inject errors throughout the applica-
tion’s virtual memory space. However, many regions of the virtual space may
not be valid or in use and fault injection in these areas would be meaningless.
Fiesta++, therefore, extracts the memory regions in use at the time of fault
injection and then injects faults only in the valid memory.
3.3.2 Obtaining Runtime Allocated Dynamic Memory
The blackbox mode requires automatic extraction of the memory re-
gions in use at the fault injection time for determining the fault location. The
19
tool needs a list of all the dynamic memory blocks in use. Fiesta++ uses
the dynamic memory management hooks provided by the GNU C Library
(GLIBC) to get the runtime state of the heap.
The dynamic memory management functions (malloc,realloc and free)
are called using function pointer variables ( malloc hook, realloc hook and
free hook). These function pointers can be reassigned to a user specific func-
tions so that the user functions are called instead of the GLIBC memory
management functions. In Fiesta++ we use these hooks to insert our own dy-
namic memory allocation tracking functions before the calls to malloc,realloc
and free to log each memory allocation and deallocation operation.
These logs are stored in a standard vector (a dynamic data structure
that provides random access with amortized constant time appends) data
structure and the log for each memory allocation or deallocation operation is
appended into a vector like data structure. Since a push back operation on a
vector has an amortized constant time complexity, the insertion of these hooks
does not pose significant time overhead on the memory allocation functions.
To estimate the time overhead of inserting these memory tracking libraries,
the run time of eight SPEC benchmark applications (listed in Chapter 4) com-
piled with and without the libraries were observed. The difference in run time
for all the benchmarks was insignificant (in the order of milliseconds).
These memory allocation tracking functions are provided as a static
library which needs to be included during the linking of the test application
object files. Fiesta++ uses GDB to query the state of the memory allocation
20
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Figure 3.2: The runtime stack frame structure for applications.
log data structure provided by the memory allocation tracking functions. This
log is processed to get the pointers to the currently allocated blocks on the heap
and their sizes. The log maintains the order of allocation which could be used
to determine the most/least recently allocated blocks. For the basic random
bit flip fault model, an address is randomly chosen from all the allocated
memory addresses as the target for fault injection.
3.3.3 Runtime Stack Memory
The stack memory in use can be obtained by querying the value of
the stack pointer in GDB. The stack pointer(%esp) is a pointer to the top of
the stack. GDB commands backtrace and info frame can be used to get the
bottom of the stack. All the memory addresses between the top and bottom
of the stack are considered to be in use.
The interface with GDB allows Fiesta++ to get information about the
different stack frames present at the time of injection. Fig. 3.2 describes
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the stack frame structure for applications compiled using GCC on x86 ISA
processors. Fiesta++ extracts all the information shown in the figure for each
stack frame. Users can use this information to develop specialized fault models
and fault injection campaigns targeting specific regions of the stack such as
function arguments, local variables or the stored registers.
3.3.4 Extracting Global Variable Addresses
The global variable addresses can be fetched from the application binary
address itself. The global variables are stored in .data and .bss segments in the
application binary. The starting virtual address for these sections and sizes
can be obtained using the GNU objdump utility. Fiesta++ gets the starting
address and size of these sections before starting the application simulation.
3.4 White Box Mode Fault Injection
The white box mode of fault injection is useful when the user has some
knowledge of the application software structure and access to the source code.
The white box mode allows the user to specify the fault targets in terms of
application code variables and the injection time in terms of code execution
events. This allows the user to conduct deterministic and replicable fault
injection campaigns for applications.
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void foo(int n) {
    int fault_target;
    if(n > 20){// start of FI scope
       for(int j=0; j<n; j++){
       // variable access count
       // used for determining  
       // injection time
           fault_target = bar(j);
       }
    } // end of FI scope  
    else{
    // fault won't be injected here
        fault_target = 0;
    }
}
Fault injection
    location
 Fault injection 
      scope
Figure 3.3: An example of using scope and variable access specification to
describe fault timing in whitebox mode
3.4.1 Fault Injection Target and Location
The fault targets in the whitebox mode are specified using the applica-
tion code variables. The fault injection timing is specified using a combination
of two parameters: code scope trigger and a variable access trigger.
For each fault injection target the user needs to specify the code scope
during which the fault injection is activated. The code scope is specified in
terms of either a function or line numbers in the source code file. The fault
target should be a valid variable in this scope. Fiesta++ monitors the number
of times this scope is hit during code execution. Once the hit count is greater
than the code scope trigger, Fiesta++ sets up a variable access monitor for
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  set scope
  start/end 
breakpoints
start
  #hits >
threshold?
set variable
watchpoint
    reached 
end of scope?
clear variable's
  #accesses &
  watchpoints
Yes
access# >
threshold?
wait...
inject fault stop
No
Yes
Breakpoint
      hit
Yes
No
No
Watchpoint
      hit
Figure 3.4: Flowchart for deciding the fault injection time in whitebox mode
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the target variable.
The variable access monitor is set up using a hardware breakpoint which
stops code execution whenever the target variable address is accessed. The
fault is injected when the variable access count is greater than the variable
access trigger specified by the user. The access count is reset to zero if the
program execution goes out of the specified scope. The flowchart in Figure.
3.4 describes the decision process taken by Fiesta++ to determine the timing
of fault injection in the whitebox mode.
The number of hardware breakpoints that can be simultaneously active
is generally limited by the processor architecture. Our test processor allowed a
maximum of 4 hardware breakpoints to be active at any given time. Fiesta++
has a queue to store the set of active fault targets that need to be monitored.
Based on the number of hardware breakpoints allowed, access monitors are set
up for the targets in the queue.
Such a dual monitoring mechanism enables specifying accurate injection
timings for all kinds of variables. Often variables are declared in the local scope
(such as functions, loops, blocks) and may not be visible at a global scope.
This code scope where the variable is valid can be specified using the code
scope trigger mechanism. Inside the valid scope the variable may be access
numerous times, for example, inside a loop and the accurate injection timing
can be specified using the variable access count trigger.
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Chapter 4
Fault Injection Experiments using Fiesta++
This chapter discusses the results of fault injection experiments that
were conducted using Fiesta++. The effect of a fault in the software state
depends on various properties of the application’s code. The aim of these fault
injection experiments is to find and learn about any relationship that might
exist between the different outcomes, the fault locations and timing. Fiesta++
allows us to inject faults at different points of time during the application run
and target faults in specific memory regions. The fault injection experiments
described in this chapter were carried out using the Fiesta++ black box mode
for eight SPEC2000 benchmark applications. The ref inputs of the benchmark
suite were used for evaluation. The application runtime for these inputs range
from 30 seconds to 3 minutes on a six core, 2.8GHz AMD PhenomII processor
with 8GB RAM. Each application run spans hundreds of billions of application
instruction executions.
In each experiment, a single fault was injected using the single bit flip
model. The behavior and outcome of the application under test was observed
and the result was categorized in one of the following four categories.
• Application Hang: The fault injection resulted in the application running
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for more than twice its usual runtime.
• Crash: The application terminated prematurely with a possible excep-
tion as a result of fault injection.
• Silent Data Corruption: The application terminated normally however,
its final output did not match the output from an error free run.
• No error: The fault injected did not have any affect on the application
behavior or output.
4.1 Fault vulnerability over application runtime
Applications over different phases during run time perform different
tasks. The effect of faults during these different phases may differ depending
on the code structure for these tasks.
In order to determine how the fault vulnerability of an application
changes over the run time, I conducted fault injection campaigns where faults
were injected in applications at different time points during its run time. A
single bit error was injected in the application memory during each run. The
following sections discuss the results obtained when these faults were injected
in the different memory regions.
4.1.1 Dynamic memory fault vulnerability
Dynamic memory, or the heap, stores the variables that are allocated
at runtime using the memory management functions such as malloc, realloc or
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new. For most applications, the dynamic memory is the largest of the three
different data memory regions.
The SPEC2000 benchmark applications used for these experiments had
dynamic memory sizes ranging from 3 MB to 190 MB. We injected faults at
random time instants distributed uniformly over the application’s runtime.
For each application, over 2000 fault injection experiments were carried out.
The graphs in Figure 4.1 plots the variation in percentage of different outcomes
for fault injection carried out at different points during the application’s run.
Table. 4.1 gives the average outcome percentages for the eight benchmark
applications.
Benchmarks
Fault Outcome
No Errors SDC Crash Timeout
ammp 94.47 % 0.55 % 4.97 % 0.00 %
art 89.50 % 6.50 % 3.50 % 0.50 %
equake 71.50 % 11.50 % 17.00 % 0.00 %
gzip 69.50 % 20.00 % 0.00 % 10.50 %
mcf 91.50 % 3.50 % 4.50 % 0.50 %
mesa 95.50 % 1.50 % 3.00 % 0.00 %
twolf 27.69 % 7.17 % 24.61 % 40.51 %
vpr 53.50 % 23.50 % 18.00 % 5.00 %
Average 74.05 % 9.39 % 9.45 % 7.11 %
Table 4.1: Fault injection outcome distribution for fault injected in the appli-
cation dynamic memory
Most injected faults in the dynamic memory do not cause any observ-
able error in the application’s output or behavior. However, the average out-
come percentages for a fault when injected in the three memory regions, the
28
number of silent data corruptions and timeouts are significantly more for dy-
namic memory. Given the fact that the dynamic memory size is greater than
10× the rest of all the memory regions combined, this difference in outcome
percentages seems to be even more significant. The number of faults injected
compared to the total in-use memory is extremely small.
4.1.2 Stack memory fault vulnerability
The application runtime stack stores the local variables for the execut-
ing functions, the function call signature and the function arguments. Figure
4.2 shows the fault vulnerability of the stack memory over the application
runtime. Analysis of how the fault vulnerability varies for each of the different
classes of data on the stack will be presented in a later section of this chapter.
4.1.3 Global variable fault vulnerability
The global variables for an application are stored in two sections in
the application binary, .data and .bss. Figure 4.3 shows the global variable
fault vulnerability for eight SPEC benchmark applications. For some of the
applications such as ammp and equake, a fault in a global variable has almost
no effect. However, faults in the global variables have a significant impact on
the output of the Art benchmark.
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Figure 4.1: Dynamic memory fault vulnerability for SPEC2000 benchmark
applications
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Figure 4.2: Local variable fault vulnerability for SPEC2000 benchmark appli-
cations
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Figure 4.3: Global variable fault vulnerability for SPEC2000 benchmark ap-
plications
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4.2 Fault vulnerability of different stack regions
The stack structure stores the different types of data variables such
as the function signature, local variables and the function arguments in sep-
arate sections in the stack frame. Fiesta++ allows us to access each section
independently and target fault injection to one or more of these areas and eval-
uate their fault vulnerability. The following sections discuss the experimental
results for fault injections targeted for regions in the application stack frame.
4.2.1 Fault vulnerability in the top most stack frame
Fiesta++ provides information on all the active stack frames in the
application at any given point of time. A fault model can be developed that
injects faults only in the top frame on the stack. The top frame on the stack
is the frame for the currently executing function.
If it is assumed that the faults mainly occur in the processor hardware
(assuming memories are protected with ECC), there is a larger probability
that the errors due to faults would manifest themselves in the variables recently
accessed at the time of fault occurrence. As far as local variables are concerned,
the top frame would contain the local variables for the currently executing
function and would have been recently accessed. A fault injection campaign
was carried out to see if the fault behavior for injections in the full application
stack differ significantly from those in the top stack frame.
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Benchmarks
Fault Outcome
No Errors SDC Crash Timeout
ammp 70.63% (97%) 9.37%(1.5%) 18.75% (1.5%) 1.25% (0.0%)
art 75.00% (67%) 2.50% (8.5%) 22.50% (23.5%) 0.00% (1%)
equake 67.50% (96%) 2.50% (2%) 30.00% (2%) 0.00% (0%)
gzip 61.11% (77%) 1.11% (5%) 37.78% (18%) 0.00% (0%)
mcf 32.50% (78.5%) 8.50% (5.5%) 57.00% (14.5%) 2.00% (1.5%)
mesa 63.89% (95%) 0.00% (0%) 36.11% (5%) 0.00% (0%)
twolf 46.50% (81.5%) 7.50% (4.5%) 46.00% (14%) 0.00% (0%)
vpr 60.00% (93%) 3.50% (3%) 35.50% (4%) 1.00% (0%)
Average 59.28 % (85.63%) 4.34 % (3.75%) 35.85 % (10.31%) 0.53 % (0.31%)
Table 4.2: Fault injection outcome distribution for errors in the top stack
frame. The numbers in parentheses are the error outcome probabilities when
fault is injected at a random address chosen from the full application stack.
4.2.2 Fault injection in function call signature
The function call signature consists of the return address for the func-
tion and the stored base pointer. Modifying the return address causes the
program execution to jump to an erroneous location after the return instruc-
tion in the current executing function is executed. Modifying the base pointer
leads to a wrong address computation for the local variables. Both these errors
lead to corruption of a large number of variables in the application program
which I expected would lead the application to crash most of the time.
One of the aims of this experiment was to see of the outcome probability
for error injection in these variables is constant across different applications. If
this is so, these can be excluded from fault injection experiments all together as
their outcome is mostly known. Table 4.3 shows the fault outcome probability
for the eight SPEC benchmark applications.
As the data shows, although the assumption that most fault injections
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Benchmarks
Fault Outcome
No Errors SDC Crash Timeout
ammp 48.33% 1.11% 47.78% 2.78%
art 4.50% 16% 76.50% 3.00%
equake 20.50% 10.50% 69.00% 0.00%
gzip 49.00% 1.50% 49.50% 0.00%
mcf 24.00% 13.00% 63.00% 0.00%
mesa 36.00% 0.00% 64.00% 0.00%
twolf 15.50% 11.00% 72.50% 1.00%
vpr 58.00% 8.5% 33.50% 0.00%
Average 31.77 % 7.78 % 59.62 % 0.82 %
Table 4.3: Fault injection outcome distribution for errors in function signature
would result in an application crash stands true, the probability of the applica-
tion crash varies widely across different benchmark applications. For example,
while art, equake and twolf result in crashes for more the two-thirds of the
total injections, the crash probability for ammp and vpr is extremely low.
It must be noted that the probability of silent data corruptions for
fault injections in the function signature is greater than the probability for
the same for injections in the full application stack. This indicates that the
function signature errors contribute significantly to the silent data corruption
statistics.
4.2.3 Fault injection in local variables and function arguments
Local variables and function arguments of the application stack corre-
spond directly to the application variables. Hence, fault injection in the local
variables region of the stack frame is essentially the same as fault injection
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at the source code level in the function local variables. Table 4.4 compares
the fault injection outcome percentages for the local variable fault injection
versus the outcomes for fault injection in the entire valid stack frame. This
comparison illustrates how the outcomes would differ if fault injection were
carried out at the source code level versus when carried out at the assembly
instruction level.
Benchmarks
Fault Outcome
No Errors SDC Crash Timeout
ammp 91.67% (97%) 0.00%(1.5%) 7.78% (1.5%) 0.56% (0.0%)
art 94.50% (67%) 3.00% (8.5%) 2.50% (23.5%) 0.00% (1%)
equake 22.00% (96%) 1.50% (2%) 76.50% (2%) 0.00% (0%)
gzip 81.00% (77%) 2.50% (5%) 16.50% (18%) 0.00% (0%)
mcf 85.00% (78.5%) 0.00% (5.5%) 25.00% (14.5%) 0.00% (1.5%)
mesa 75.00% (95%) 0.00% (0%) 25.00% (5%) 0.00% (0%)
twolf 88.00% (81.5%) 2.00% (4.5%) 10.00% (14%) 0.00% (0%)
vpr 97.78% (93%) 1.11% (3%) 1.11% (4%) 0.00% (0%)
Average 78.94 % (85.63%) 1.32 % (3.75%) 19.67 % (10.31%) 0.06 % (0.31%)
Table 4.4: Fault injection outcome distribution for errors in the local variables
and function arguments. The numbers in parentheses are the error outcome
probabilities when fault is injected at a random address chosen from the full
application stack.
4.3 Fault Injection Overhead
Fiesta++ poses a run time overhead for each fault injection. This
overhead is a result of the time spent communicating via GDB with the target
application for memory status queries and fault injection commands. Table
4.5 shows the average observed run time overhead in seconds the fault injection
mechanism posed for fault injection in each of the three memory regions.
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Memory Region
Time Overhead
(seconds)
Dynamic Memory 2.9
Stack Memory 1.2
Globals 0.11
Table 4.5: Run time overhead in seconds posed by the Fiesta++ fault injection
mechanism
The time overhead for injecting faults into dynamic memory is higher
due to the large number of dynamically allocated memory blocks in the SPEC
benchmark applications. Fiesta++ spends significant amount of time reading
the dynamic memory block list from the memory tracking libraries. For stack
memory fault injection, Fiesta++ reads the stack frame information through
GDB which results in a moderate run time overhead. For global memory
variables, the size and location of the variables can be obtained from the
application binary and does not need to be queried at runtime using GDB.
This results in a minimal fault injection time overhead.
4.4 Conclusion
We can make some notable observations from the experiments described
in the preceding sections. Although, there are some visible trends between the
fault injection timing, location and the fault outcome, these cannot be general-
ized for all applications. The graphs for fault vulnerability over injection time
show that for various applications, certain time periods during the application
run, errors in memory have a greater probability of affecting the output or
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behavior.
The fault outcome probability heavily depends on the fault model as-
sumed for the software level faults. The significant difference in the outcome
probability when faults were concentrated in the top stack frame versus when
they were injected throughout the application stack illustrates the fact. Faults
originating from the processor will be concentrated in the memory regions
being accessed by it, while those originating in the memory will be evenly
distributed across the memory.
The faults in data other than the application variables, such as the
function signature, contributes significantly to the silent data corruptions and
application crashes. These faults cannot be ignored and software based fault
injection tools that operate only on software defined variables will miss these
faults.
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Chapter 5
Future Work
There are two directions in which this work can be carried forward.
First is adding more functionality to Fiesta++ to enable it to support a wider
variety of fault models. It currently lacks the ability to inject faults in the
application code. Adding this ability will enable it to mimic faults in the
processor fetch and decode stage which lead to the instruction being inter-
preted incorrectly. Some support for identifying the recently accessed memory
addresses at any given point of time during application runtime would be use-
ful for emulating the fault model where a fault in the processor leads to a
corrupted instruction output.
A second direction in which this work could be extended is in developing
accurate fault models for different applications. For hardware faults, currently
there is lack of clear understanding about how a fault in the processor would
translate into fault in the software state. There have been results illustrating
that a memory bit flip model may not correctly represent the fault outcome
at software level[6], however, they do not specify what could be a reasonable
fault model for software level fault injection.
Also, the fault models in Fiesta++ could be extended to include a
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wider variety of software faults. Currently it supports fault models to incre-
ment/decrement software variables which would test for off-by-one bugs in
software. These fault models could be extended to cover a larger variety of
software bugs.
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